air in a steady flow system. Respirator interior and exterior surfaces were swab sampled on days -1 (prior to exposure), 0 (day of exposure), 1, 3, 7, 10, 14, 21, and 28 . Between samplings, each res~irator was stored at room temperature in a Zip-lock M bag. Seven days after exposure the number of viable organisms decreased from a mean range of 27 to 131 colony forming units per square centimeter (CFU!cm 2 ) to zero CFU/cm 2 on the exterior of the different respirator models. While several respirators had interior contamination immediately following challenge, no transfer of exterior H37Ra was observed. Some colony growth was recoverable from
• day 14 to 28 indicating there was some incidental contamination with environmental bacteria to the interior of the respirator after repeated handling and storage.
BACKGROUND
Safety issues related to work-site conditions have been increasing with the relatively recent recognition of potential for employee exposure to infectious agents and have recently been addressed by the Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for "airborne" Mycobacterium tuberculosis droplet nuclei (NIOSH, 1995a) . The need for guidelines promulgating worker protection from infectious aerosols has been accentuated by the reemergence of tuberculosis and the prevalence of drug and multi-drug resistant strains of tuberculosis (CDC, 1980; CDC, 1983; CDC, 1989; CDC, 1991a; CDC, 1991 b; CDC, 1994; Kantor, 1988; Destasio, 1990; Reeves, 1981) .
New hospitals and healthcare facilities are being designed and constructed with isolation areas that post signs warning of potential hazards. Isolation areas or rooms may employ some or all of the following engineered systems: air pressure gradients, High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration, ultra-violet light panels, and increased air exchange rates to prevent or minimize the spread of airborne microorganisms. It is difficult, if not impossible in terms of cost or physical engineering requirements, to similarly retrofit existing facilities. While these engineering improvements are imporKeywords: filtering facepiece respirator, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, reuse, storage Disclaimer: Mention of commercial product or trade name does not constitute endorsement by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground. tant to safeguard the health of employees, those entering rooms occupied by infectious patients who may, over time, have close contact with infected patients, need a different protection strategy involving the use of personal respirators.
Many respirators certified under Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 84 will be issued to health-care workers as personal protective devices (NIOSH, 1995b) . No data is available to indicate that these respirators maybe stored and periodically re-used. The reuse of these respirators would help to increase the accessibility and lower the cost of using respirators.
In order to reduce costs due to the use of respirator filter replacement, healthcare administrators have requested guidance concerning the safety of reusing disposable -respirators: specifically the viability of Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb) on the respirator filter material. A recent study using three simulants for Mtb shows that organisms do maintain viability when delivered as an aerosol through respirators (Brosseau, 1997) . It is unclear however, what proportion of viable particles are found on the exterior surface of the respirator as opposed to in the matrix of the respirator material. There is currently little information on the possibility of the respirator becoming contaminated with bacteria and/or fungi due to storage in plastic bags that lack ventilation and may create a humid environment after being exposed to Mtb. The possibility also exists that the healthcare worker could inadvertently contaminate the inside of the respirator through normal handling, bagging, and removal procedures. This study provides information on these aspects of the respirator reuse issue, testing several types of respirators commonly used in hospital settings following aerosol challenge with Mtb organisms.
The objectives of this study were to: (1) determine whether, and for how long, avirulent Mtb (strain H37Ra) survives on the exterior of the respirator, (2) assess levels of contamination with bacteria and fungi due to storage in airtight bags, and (3) determine and measure levels of contamination spread to the interior the respirator due to normal handling (removing respirator from bag, replacing respirator in bag).
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Strain of Mycobacterium tuberculosis
H37Ra from the American Type Culture collection (ATCC #25177) in Manassas, VA, was used for the aerosol challenge of the respirators. H37Ra stocks were continuously grown and harvested in log phase growth to provide a reproducible inoculum if needed for extended testing. Cultures of H37Ra were maintained in Middlebrook 7H9 broth with 0.05% Tween® 80 and 20% ADC enrichment (Remel Labs, Lenexa, KS) and incubated in air at 37 C. Growth phase and viability were monitored and graphed for several weeks prior to, as well as during testing, to ensure stock homogeneity and culture viability was maintained. Monitoring was performed at 10 to 12 hour intervals using a Klett-Summerson photoeletric colorimeter (Keitt Manufacturing, New York, NY) in the range of 400-465 nm and by serially diluting aliquots of culture which were plated on 7H10 agar with 0.05% Tween® 80 and 20% ADC enrichment and performing colony counts after three weeks incubation.
Respirators
A variety of respirators most likely used in healthcare settings were chosen for this study. Candidate respirators are classified under 42 CFR, Part 84 as belonging to the N95 and P100 groups (NIOSH, 1995b) . Four models of respirators from the N95 and 2 from the P100 group were tested (Table 1) with 10 replicates per model.
Aerosolization of H37Ra
Aerosols were generated using a Collison ™ neubulizer (BCI Inc., Waltham, MA) at 30 psi in an effort to reduce shear forces, which may contribute to inactivation of microorganisms ( Figure 1 ).
Previous in-house studies by Dugway Proving Ground, have shown the Collison™ atomizes microbiological samples more gently, as compared with the Chicago" atomizer (Dependable Scientific Glassworks, Salt Lake City, UT), yet still provides control over particle size with the adjustment of air pressure and fluid output. Mass median aerodynamic diameters ranged from 9.0 to 9.6 micrometers {Jim). The actual size of the particles were approximately 1 /-lm in width and 2.5/-lm in length ( Scanning electron micrograph of H37Ra particle (U.S. Army photograph)
FIGURE 3
Respirator with Custom Manifold (U.S. Army photograph)
Organisms were aerosolized in culture media supplemented with 0.05% Tween® 80 at room temperature and humidity (approximately 22°C and 50%) and collected on respirator surfaces and nonporous control plates. Prior to aerosolization, stock solutions were vortexed to assist in breaking up clumps. After the larger particles settled out of suspension (approximately 10 minutes), the supernate containing smaller-sized single particles was collected, assayed for viability, and used for aerosol challenges.
Aerosols were generated in Biotron, a Class III, redundantly HEPA-filtered glove box specially designed and constructed by U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground (DPG). Each of the six respirators tested was sealed to a custom designed manifold with hot wax ( The simultaneous exposure of all respirator types coupled with use of the same operator during sampling procedures was instituted to minimize variation throughout the experiment. Aerosolization of H37Ra was determined and monitored inside the containment chamber (where the respirators were located) using an Aerodynamic Particle Sizer (APS), (TSI Inc., St. Paul, MN).
Aerosols were characterized with respect to particle size and concentration with the APS. The APS data is "real-time" information and provides aerosol number, mass, and surface concentration using laser velocimetry. The aerosol concentration inside the challenge chamber was controlled and maintained by monitoring the APS concentration and adjusting dilution air volumes when needed.
Respirator Sampling
Respirator interior and exterior surfaces (i.e., the inside and outside) were sampled by procedures adapted from DPG Standing Operating Procedure 389 and DPGTest Operation Procedures 8-2-111 (West Desert Test Center, 1991; West Desert Test
FIGURE 4 Aerosolization Test Chamber with Mounted Respirators (U.S. Army photograph)
Center, 1992). These are the standard procedures used by the U.S. military for sampling biological agents. The adaptation was the use of H37Ra. Between sampling days, respirators were stored in closed commercially available Zip-lock' bags and held at room temperature, as they would be in a healthcare setting. All handling and manipulation of respirators was performed within a Class II biological safety cabinet by personnel wearing non-sterile examination gloves to ensure personnel safety and minimize non-test related contamination. One respirator of each type was marked as a template with a randomized 1 x 5 centimeter grid across the interior and exterior surfaces ( Figure 5) .
The grid was numbered to correspond to sampling days. After daily sampling, the swabbed areas were blocked in with a marking pen to prevent re-swabbing of the same areas. At the end of the test, the "blocked-in" respirator looked like the template respirator. A non-porous plate marked with a grid and hand led the same way as the respirators, served as a positive control to verify that viable organisms were recoverable using swabbing techniques. Wetted, sterile, dissolvable C1agiswab Type 3 swabs (Spectrum Laboratories, Dallas, TX) were rolled across the surfaces to be sampled, placed in tubes containing 5 ml medium, and vortexed gently for 30 seconds to dislodge collected bacterial particles. Three interior and three exterior grid locations (randomly distributed across each respirator) were sampled on each day of sampling. This design using randomized multiple sampling positions on each respirator was established to decrease the effect of surface variation within each given respirator. Aliquots (0.2 ml) of medium were plated in triplicate on 7H10 agar for H37Ra, and incubated until colony formation was confirmed (3 weeks). Respirators were sampled on days -1 ( 1 day prior to exposure), 0 (day of exposure), 1, 3, 7, 10, 14,21, and 28 (days after exposure).
(1) (volume of sample dilution)
Respirator with Sampling Grid (U.S. Army photograph)
Data is described in terms of recoverable CFU per em' of respirator material (Equation 1).
Colonies of Mtb were identified by their dryness, roughness, off-white color, being heaped up in the center, and irregular margins.
Data was analyzed using non parametric methods since the data was not normal. A nonparametric method known as Cochran's Test for Related Observations was used to determine if respirator types differed in interior contamination. (Daniel, 1990) . The statistical test requires that data be binomial in nature, so respirators are categorized as either contaminated or not contaminated, with no consideration to the magnitude of the contamination.
A Friedman two-way ANOVA was performed to look at differences in exterior contamination between respirators. The factors were respirator type and replicate. The ANOVA was calculated separately for each day following contamination (-1, 0, 1, 3, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28) . A multiple-comparison procedure for use with Friedman test was used to group the respirators (Daniel, 1990) .
The examination of statistical outliers was not done. All data was used except where biological contamination excluded a data point. No data was excluded simply because it was deemed an outlier. Furthermore, the non parametric methods used are robust to outliers.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics (such as the number of test samples, minimum, median, maximum, first quartile, and third quartile) for CFU/cm 2 are reported for each respirator by sampling day.
Exterior Surfaces H37Ra Survival Time On Exterior Of Respirators
From the data showing CFU/cm 2 for each respirator for each of the different days after initial (Table 2) , it is evident that between 3 and 7 days, nearly all H37Ra is no longer viable (i.e., no more viable H37Ra organisms were recovered after day 7). From samples taken on days 7, 10, 14, 21, and 28 after initial contamination, most respirator types had no CFU/cm2i those that did, had only one respirator of ten with any positive counts, and then at no more than 0.667 CFU/cm 2 (average of triplicate plates). Data from the nonporous control plates followed the same trend. It is not feasible to fit a curve to the data due to the fact that the CFU/cm 2 counts dropped so precipitously and to the limited number of data points (i.e., less than half) greater than zero. To obtain enough non-zero data points, the data would have to have been counted every twelve hours rather than daily. For respirator 1, the CFU/cm 2 counts were zero by day 3. By day 7, the CFU!cm 2 counts
were zero for five of the six respirators. From this data, it cannot be determined when the values attained zero, only that it occurred sometime between days 3 and 7. All respirators had median CFU!cm 2 counts of 0 by day 3 indicating that the decay rate for aerosolized monodispersed H37Ra is very rapid, at least 90% per day which is very likely due to the lack of accompanying biomass and the small dispersion size.
Differences Between Respirators in the Exterior
CFU/cm
2 Counts
The question of whether the respirators differ in the number of CFU/cm 2 recovered from the exterior of the respirator on the different days following the initial contamination can be answered using the Friedman two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test (Daniel, 1990) . The results for Friedman's twoway ANOVA test were not significant at the =.05 level except for day 0 (Table 3 ). The test statistic was adjusted to account for ties. Table 4 shows the results of the multiple comparisons, where respirators having the same letter in the groupings column do not differ significantly at the = 0.10 level.
The results demonstrate that the respirators differed in the number of CFU/cm 2 recovered only on the day the respirators were initially contaminated with H37Ra. With respirators 5, 2, and 3 having the lowest CFU!cm 2 recovered and respirators 4, 6, and 1 having the highest CFU!cm 2 recovered. After day 0, there are no statistically significant differences between respirators and the number of CFU!cm 2 recovered. This is most likely due to the very high decay rate and the fact that the CFU!cm 2 is limited by zero. While there may be differences initially between respirators in the number of CFU/cm 2 that can be recovered, the decay of the H37Ra is so Company, 1990 rapid that by day 1 the respirators are not statistically different. The initial differences in the external retention of aerosolized H37Ra could be due to electrostatic factors associated with the material the respirators were made from, differences in the materials' surface adsorption, or filter pore size (exclusion) (Hinds, 1982; Liu and Rubow, 1986) . Interior Surfaces
Determination of Interior Contamination
Several respirators had minor interior contamination (i.e., less than 0.2 CFU/cm 2 ) with H37Ra on Day 0 following aerosol exposure. Data for each of the different time periods following the initial contamination indicate that from day one through day ten there was no interior contamination for any of the six respirators (Table 5) . Assays taken on days 14, 21, and 28 after the initial contamination show that interior contamination occurred, although very limited in the number of respirators and the magnitude of the CFU!cni 2 count. Colony size and morphology was indicative of a non-H37Ra environmental bacterial contaminant. No fungi were noted. Usually only a single respirator of the 10 replicates for any respirator type showed interior contamination, with 2 out of 10 respirators showing interior contamination being the most for a respirator type (Table 5 ).
This indicates that interior contamination did not occur until sometime between days 10 and 14 following exposure. Four of the 60 respirators were seen to have contamination during this time period. The 95 percent confidence interval for the percentage of respirators showing interior contamination is (3.87, 11.69) with a point estimate of 7.78 percent for all respirators pooled across days 14, 21, and 28 (Table 6) .
This interior contamination is believed to be most likely due to manipulation during sampling and not storage. Had the contamination come from the interior of the bags (implicating storage), we have expected to see many more instances of contamination in the study as whole as on subsequent samplings of individual respirators where spurious fungi were detected. If this is the case, then handling a respirator could cause contamination to occur on any day after the exposure, not just between days 10 and 14 as seen in this study. The low numbers of organisms recovered from the nonporous positive control support the conclusion that environmental contaminants were responsible for colony counts observed on respirator interiors from day 14-28.
Differences In Interior Contamination Between Days Following Challenge
Because the data are sparse in terms of respirators showing interior contamination and the data are not normal, a non parametric method known as Cochran's Test for Related Observations was used to determine if respirator types differed in interior contamination (Daniel, 1990) . The statistical test requires that data be binomial in nature, so respirators are categorized as either contaminated or not contaminated, with no consideration to the magnitude of the contamination.
Cochran's Test was used for days 0, 14, 21, and 28 days following exposure. For days -1, 1, 3, 7, and 10 following exposure all masks showed no contamination. The P-values are given in Table 7 .
The conclusion is that respirator types do not differ in terms of susceptibility to interior contamination.
CONCLUSIONS
It appears that many respirators may be reused over time with little risk over a week's time of internal contamination with H37Ra provided they are carefully handled and stored (e.g., only handling the respirator by its non-filter components, placing the respirator into the bag immediately after use, etc.), Further, it has been shown that reaerosolization of Mtb surrogate bacteria collected on a respirator is insignificant under normal conditions of respirator (Qian et aI., 1997) . However, since no exposure limit or 10 50 value has been established for Mtb, it is impossible to say with certainty that the low number of CFUs observed in this study would not be detrimental to individuals with compromised health or belonging to other at-risk groups.
